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This paper develops a duopolistic discounted marketing model with linear advertising
costs and advertised prices for mature markets still in expansion. Generic and predatory
advertising effects are combined together in the model. We characterise a class of adver-
tising models with some lowered production costs. For such a class of models, advertising
investments have a no-free-riding strict Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if discount
rates are small. We discuss the entity of this efficiency at varying of parameters of our
advertising model. We provide a computational framework in which market shares can be
computed at equilibrium, too. We analyse market share dynamics for an asymmetrical
numerical scenario where one of the two firms is more effective in generic and preda-
tory advertising. Several numerical insights on market share dynamics are obtained. Our
computational framework allows for different scenarios in practical applications and it
is developed thanks to Mathematica software.
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1. Introduction
Advertising expenditures for companies may be generally viewed as a form of in-
vestment and the main thrust of the advertising literature is to examine optimal
strategies which maximise the net present value of future cash flows. When adver-
tising is aimed at increasing product sales, then it is called generic or informative
advertising, whilst when advertising is aimed at gaining market shares, it is called
brand advertising. When brand advertising is devoted to stealing customers from
competitors, it is called predatory advertising. Many advertising models have been
built to provide solutions in monopolistic, duopolistic and oligopolistic environments
(Vidale and Wolfe, 1957; Sethi, 1973; Deal, 1979; Little, 1979; Sethi, 1983) for many
decision variables. a Distinct dynamic advertising strategies were never developed
prior to the model developed in (Bass et al., 2005, Table 1) for brand and generic
advertising respectively. Even the deep dynamic analysis provided in (Bass et al.,
2005) suggests that generic advertising expenditures must be highly resolved sepa-
rately from its brand advertising ones in order to halt suboptimal advertising. How-
ever externalities from simple generic advertising may become significant and may
modify brand preferences, as market demand becomes more informed (Kinnucan,
1996; Norman et al., 2008; Rutz and Bucklin, 2011; Brahim et al., 2014). The main
controversial economic issue is that generic advertising may redistribute market
shares, especially in markets that have become strongly differentiated(Chakravarti
and Janiszewski, 2004; Brady, 2009; Espinosa and Mariel, 2001; Piga, 1998; Fried-
man, 1983). In the current paper, predatory and generic advertising expenditures
are combined together.
The analysis provided in (Espinosa and Mariel, 2001) deals with a duopoly where
generic and predatory advertising are present but separately analyzed. The authors
argue that static strategies do not internalise any variations of market shares if
firms play a game with time-invariant market shares. Therefore it is expected that
Nash equilibria are neither efficient if the advertising is predatory (too high expen-
ditures), nor efficient if advertising is generic (too low expenditures). In the current
paper we face a more complex scenario than the static one analysed in (Espinosa
and Mariel, 2001). In fact, generic and brand/predatory advertising are unified and
their effect on market shares cannot be distinguished at any time for an infinite time
aFor a complete review of the literature on advertising models before 1995 see (Erickson, 1995). The
more recent classification of advertising models consists of six categories (Huang et al., 2012); the
Nerlove-Arrow model and its extensions, the Vidale-Wolfe model and its extensions, the Lanchester
model and its extensions, the diffusion models, dynamic advertising-competition models with other
attributes, and (vi) empirical studies for dynamic advertising problems.
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horizon. Strategic generic advertising interactions between firms may cause short-
run bubble effects but similar predatory effects may cause long-run lowering effects
on market shares, especially for asymmetrical market conditions. For instance, dif-
ferent investment strategies may generate different market share dynamics, which
yield the same discounted profit to one of the firms. To some extent, the efficiency
of such equilibria is not so intuitive. For instance, in (Espinosa and Mariel, 2001)
closed-loop equilibria are more efficient than open-loop equilibria if the advertising
is only generic while open-loop are more efficient than closed-loop if the advertis-
ing is only predatory. Very little attention has been devoted to the efficiency and
stability of Nash equilibria in the game theory of advertising. The simple concept
of strong Nash equilibria, which incorporates a strong form of efficiency, may be
useful to be analysed in a duopolistic model such as this. By being complementary
to the dynamic analysis in (Espinosa and Mariel, 2001), we restrict optimal anal-
ysis to static expenditure strategies. The stability we require is the following: if a
firm unilaterally changes its strategy from Nash equilibrium strategies, then such a
firm has to be strictly worse. We fill the gap in this literature and we investigate
the existence of strict Nash equilibria in a context of generic and brand advertising
models.
2. Results
In the current paper, we initially develop a duopolistic discounted advertising model
for mature markets in expansion. Generic and predatory advertising effects are
combined together. We model generic advertising by adopting a diffusion model
and we model predatory advertising by adopting the Lanchester model of combat.
For the sake of simplicity we allow firms to advertise prices even if we do not model
the latter as a decision variable. In fact, prices may be announced before marketing
campaigns (Jiang et al., 2014; Grewal et al., 1998; Tenn and Wendling, 2014; Lu
et al., 2016). b We define a class of advertising models where production costs are
lowered by marketing parameters, being inspired by an economic analysis between
advertising and quality of products suggested in (Bagwell, 2007).
We obtain payoffs in a closed-form using tools from the theory of linear differential
systems. Significantly, payoffs are continuous but they are not quasi concave on
non-compact subsets. Our method provides for an algebraic analysis of best reply
correspondences. We find out that a strict Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists
for the class of advertising games with low costs. Interestingly, our equilibria are
not free-riding and they cannot be conceptually compared to the ones found in (Kr-
ishnamurthy, 2000). The existence of equilibria is not surprising for small discount
bWe prefer to characterise our model in terms of advertised prices to make our results comparable
to another literature stream, i.e. optimal pricing in markets with sticky prices (Gorodnichenko and
Weber, 2016; Piga, 2000). Our model is comparable to a limit case in this literature, i.e. the rate
of price readjustment is null. Recently, static optimal solutions are also provided in advertising
models subject to interferences (Baggio and Viscolani, 2014; Viscolani, 2012).
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rates by taking into account Folk theorem in game theory. However, the efficiency of
such equilibria is not so intuitive. Our strict equilibria are not obtained for any level
of production costs, as it has been found in the static model provided in (Espinosa
and Mariel, 2001). Unfortunately, due to the lack of a closed form expression of pure
strategy Nash equilibria we cannot analytically discuss the influence of the param-
eters on optimal investments strategies. However our algebraic method provides a
computational framework in order to integrate such optimal investment strategies
(Deal, 1979; Erickson, 1985).
As a further investigation, we focus on market share dynamics generated by our
strict Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Since generic advertising supports the gen-
eral standard of the product category, it brings advantages to firms in the market
regardless of whether or not they contributed to advertising campaigns (Han et al.,
2017; Shapiro, 2018). In the duopolistic model analysed in (Bass et al., 2005), when
the asymmetries between the firms increase, there is a larger difference between their
generic advertising contributions. However, the weaker firm always invests a not null
amount of money and, then, cheaply but not freely rides the market(Krishnamurthy,
2000). In our numerical scenario we assume the similar scenario adopted in (Bass
et al., 2005). One firm is stronger if it is endowed with more favourable competitive
and generic advertising parameters. Interestingly, we find out that the weaker firm
is not a cheap rider. We believe that this does not happen because our advertising
expenditure are combined together for brand and generic advertising. As an ex-
pected result, the weaker firm enlarges its market share due to generic advertising
while its market share is affected by the long run effect of predatory advertising from
its competitor. Our results support those obtained in (Bass et al., 2005). Thanks
to our numerical framework we are numerically able to integrate the time at which
the weaker firm achieves its maximum market share, if the market in itself is not
initially saturated. Similar insights cannot been replicated from the results in (Bass
et al., 2005) because the two models are similar but different.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3 we provide modelling back-
ground from the literature of advertising models. In Section 4, we provide details
of our advertising model. In Section 5 we prove the existence of proper invest-
ment equilibria in pure strategies. In Section 6 we provide an asymmetric numerical
scenario for our model and we illustrate market share dynamics if pure strategy
strict Nash equilibria investments are implemented. Our proofs are provided in the
Appendix.
3. Modelling background
Firms sell their heterogenous goods in a specific product category. Each firm satis-
fies a portion of demand, i.e. its market share xi(t) ≥ 0 for time t ≥ 0. The sum of
market shares is x(t) = x1(t)+x2(t). The market is still in expansion and the whole
demand is finite and unitary. The sum of market shares x(t) = x1(t)+x2(t) and the
remaining portion of the demand is 1−x(t), i.e. the potential demand. Potential de-
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mand is the demand which has unrevealed wish for the product category. However,
the potential demand is not already contained within market shares of any firm and
it is uninformed on the product category. Generic advertising is only directed to the
potential demand through diffusion models. Diffusion models are used to capture the
life cycle dynamics of new products or to forecast the demand on markets(Fisher and
Pry, 1971). Originally, diffusion models do not incorporate any advertising effort and
one of the main challenge is to add exogenous influences, most importantly the influ-
ence of advertising efforts (Bass et al., 1994). A generic functional form for diffusion
advertising models for firm i is ẋi(t) = f(xi(t), ui(t), t) where ui(t) is the advertising
effort and ẋi(t) is the change in market share for firm i (Dockner and Jørgensen,
1988). For instance, a diffusion model is ẋi(t) = αui(t)[1− xi(t)] + γ xi(t)[1− x(t)]
for a monopolistic firm i where α > 0 is the advertising effectiveness of the firm
and γ represents the effectiveness of word-of-mouth advertising in (Jørgensen et al.,
2006). With respect to generic advertising, we symmetrically adopt this diffusion
model with γ = 0 and α = 1 for both firms in our duopoly. The Lanchester model
has been often used to model competitive advertising (Fruchter and Kalish, 1997).
The Lanchester dynamics capture the competitive market shares’ shifts of firms
i, j due to investments in advertising by the two market rivals, (Chintagunta and
Vilcassim, 1992). The Lanchester model is ẋi(t) = ρixj(t)ui(t)−ρjxi(t)uj(t) where
ρi, ρj ∈ [0, 1] are the effectiveness of brand advertising for firms i, j (Little, 1979).
In particular, here we assume that ρi, ρj > 0 for both firms.
4. Our advertising model
We adopt some modifications to the models in the previous Section. We assume
that the advertising strategy variable ui ∈ [0,∞[ is time-invariant. Moreover we
do not adopt a linear form for investment variable ui. In spite of mathematical
simplifications we add a level of complexity and we shape advertising returns as a
functional form ai, bi : [0,∞[→ [0,∞[ for generic and brand advertising expendi-
tures respectively. We assume these functions satisfy a law of diminishing returns
on the investment for both generic and brand advertising (Hanssens et al., 2003;




: R+ → R+ is the generic advertising return for i. The coefficient
αi ∈ R




: R+ → R+ is the brand advertising return for i. The coefficient
βi ∈ R
+ \ {0} is called ineffectiveness of brand advertising return.
Functions ai(·), bi(·) are increasing and concave and approximate 1 for large invest-
ments. The lower αi and bi’s values are, the more profitable advertising investments
are. Summing up all these features of the diffusion model and of the Lanchester
model, the derivative in primary demand ẋi is modelled by the following differen-
tial system with initial conditions









where ui ∈ R
+ is the advertising expenditure of firm i, xi (t) : R
+ → [0, 1] is the
market share of firm i at time t and x0i = xi(0) are the initial market shares. We
assume linear advertising costs that are, traditionally, used in the Nerlove-Arrow
model (Gould, 1976). In the literature, it is widely accepted that firms have different
discount rates. Here firms adopt a unique positive discount rate ρ 6= 0 (Jørgensen,
1982). Therefore, the discounted flow of profits is






ri xi (t)− ui
)
dt. (2)
where ri = pi−ci. The quantity pi > 0 is the advertised price pi for the good i. The
quantity ci > 0 is the marginal cost for good i. We assume that marginal profits ri
are positive. We say that G = ([0,+∞[2, πi) is a non-cooperative advertising game.
Classical solution concepts are defined below.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibria, market shares at equilibrium). Let (û1, û2)
be a strict Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for G. Let us substitute (û1, û2) in
(1). A solution x̂i(t) of the first order differential system (1) is the associated market
share of firm i at equilibrium. A pure strategy profile is free-riding if one strategy
is null and the remaining strategy is non-null. A pure strategy profile is null when
both strategies are null. We say that a pure strategy profile is proper if it is neither
null nor free-riding.
4.1. Advertising games with low costs
We characterise advertising games which have lower costs (or higher profits) by
considering that prices are advertised in our marketing model.
Definition 2. The following inequality is satisfied
ci + c
sh









We say that G = ([0,+∞[2, πi) is the advertising game with low costs if the above
conditions are satisfied. We say that cshi > 0 is the marketing incentive for firm i.
Marketing incentives need to be smaller than the advertised price in order to satisfy
inequality (3). For instance, if firm i has a brand advertising effectiveness extremely
lower than its competitor’s counterpart ρj , inequality (3) is not satisfied. The mar-
keting incentive cshi is increasing with respect to ρj , αi, βi. The latter means that
firm i has lower costs if the effectiveness of the brand advertising of the competitor
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increases or if its advertising returns are marginally worse. The marketing incen-
tive cshi is decreasing with respect to ρi. The latter means that firm i may have
higher costs if the effectiveness of own brand advertising increases. If ρ1 = ρ2, then






5. Existence of a strict Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
In this section, we find sufficient conditions which guarantee the existence of static
advertising expenditures equilibria for our advertising model. Let Ûi : [0,+∞[→
2[0,+∞[ be the best reply correspondence for firm i. The set Ûi (uj) collects firm i’s
best replies to a strategy uj . We transform system (1) through a change of variables
into
{
ẋ = 2 {a1 (u1) + a2 (u2)} (1− x)
ẇ = ρ1b1 (u1) (x− w)− ρ2b2 (u2) (x+ w)
(5)
where x = x1 + x2 and w = x1 − x2.
Proposition 1. The solution for system (5) is given by the following formulae
{
x (t) = 1−
(




e−2At t ≥ 0














where Cu is a constant depending on
A = a1 (u1) + a2 (u2) , B
+ = ρ1b1 (u1) + ρ2b2 (u2) , B
− = ρ1b1 (u1)− ρ2b2 (u2) .
Here, we provide the following result in which market shares and payoffs are ob-
tained in closed formulas.










































for i, j = 1, 2, respectively.
Each payoff on its own variable is defined on a non-compact set [0,∞[ and may lack
quasi-concavity. Therefore, we cannot apply classical results for the existence of pure
strategy Nash equilibria. We prefer to follow a different approach to the problem
of whether a strict Nash equilibrium exists in pure strategies. First we identify an
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algebraic structure for firms’ best reply strategies, i.e. best reply strategies are zeros
of a polynomial equation.
Proposition 3. Assume ρ 6= 0. The payoff π1 (u1, u2) is rational in u1 and can be
calculated as follows
π1 (u1, u2) = −
hu31 + (b− r1d)u
2
1 + (c− r1f)u1 − r1g
ρ (hu21 + bu1 + c)
where
b = (α1 + β1)
(
ρ2 + (θ + 2ϑ) ρ+ 2θϑ
)
+ 2β1 (ρ+ θ) + ρ1α1 (ρ+ 2ϑ)
c = α1β1
(

















ρ+ 2ρ1 (ϑ+ 1)









+ ((α1 + β1)ϑ+ β1)
(





















Proof. The proof follows from a direct calculation.
Proposition 4. Assume ρ 6= 0. Let u2 ≥ 0 be a strategy of firm 2. Assume that a




























ρ (hu21 + bu1 + c)
2 +
+





ρ (hu21 + bu1 + c)
2 . (12)
If there exists a best reply in u1, trivially u1 is a root of above equation.
We conventionally rank the coefficients on the left side of equation (11) by decreasing
order. The first two Lemmas are preliminary to the fundamental Lemma 3.






then the fourth coefficient
is strictly negative, for any u2 ≥ 0.
Lemma 2. If ρ 6= 0, ρ ≈ 0 and r1 > β1
ρ2
ρ1
, then the fifth coefficient is strictly
negative for any u2 ≥ 0.
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then there exists a unique
best reply u1 > 0 for any strategy u2 ≥ 0.
A fundamental property of best reply correspondences is presented below.
Lemma 4. Under the hypothesis of Lemma 3, best reply correspondences Ûi are
continuous functions. In addition, limuj→∞ Ûi(uj) < ∞.
By a classical fixed-point argument, we prove the existence of a strict Nash equilib-
rium in pure strategies.
Theorem 1 (Main Existence Result). Assume that G = ([0,+∞[2, πi) is an
advertising game with low costs. Assume that the discount rate satisfies the following
properties: ρ 6= 0 and ρ ≈ 0. Then, a strict Nash equilibrium in proper pure strategies
exists for G.
Proof. The thesis of Lemma 4 is satisfied by hypotheses. By coercivity conditions
the image of Û2 is a bounded subset in [0,+∞[. LetK1 = Cl(Û2([0,+∞[)) ⊂]0,+∞[
be the closure of the image values of Û2. Let Û1|K1 : K1 →]0,+∞[ be the restricted
function to the compact subset K1. In addition Û1|K1(K1) is a compact subset in
]0,+∞[ because K1 is compact and Û1|K1 is continuous. By definition of K1, it
follows that Û1 ◦ Û2|K1 : K1 → K1. In addition, the above function is continuous
because it is a composition of continuous functions and K1 is a compact in ]0,+∞[.
By Brower’s fixed point Û1◦Û2|K1 admits a fixed point. Then there exists a strategy
û1 ∈ K1 ⊂]0,+∞[ such that Û1(Û2(û1)) = û1. We define û2 := Û2(u1). By Lemma
3, we have that û2 6= 0. It is straightforward to prove that (Û2(Û1))(û2) = û2. By
definition, û = (û1, û2) is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. By construction
we have that û is a strategy profile with ûi 6= 0. Therefore û is a proper strategy
profile. By Lemma 3 again, û is a strict Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
6. Market shares at equilibrium for an asymmetric advertising
situation
In this section we provide a numerical example under some asymmetric conditions
for two firms. We assume that firm 1 has higher investment returns for both generic
and predatory advertising. Further, we assume that firm 1 is more effective at cap-
turing demand belonging to the market share of the competitor, ceteribus paribus
their investments. Table 1 contains the numerical parameters for the simulation of
our model. Values of parameters of our model are listed in Table 1. It is straight-
forward to verify that our game is an advertising game with low costs. Using best
reply equation (11), we obtain implicit formulae for best reply functions. We numer-
ically integrate their intersection points, i.e. strict Nash equilibria in proper pure
strategies. Interestingly, we find that a strict Nash equilibria is unique and equal to
(5.23, 7.24) which is not free-riding. Moreover, the weaker firm invests more than
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ineffectiveness of generic advertising return α1 = 5, α2 = 10
ineffectiveness of brand advertising return β1 = 5, β2 = 15
effectiveness of brand advertising ρ1 = 1/50, ρ2 = 1/100
marketing incentive csh1 = 25/4, c
sh
1 = 45
advertised marginal prices p1 = 75, p2 = 60
marginal cost c1 = 25, c2 = 10
discount rate ρ = 0.000001
Table 1. Parameters of the model are listed. Then we compute marketing incentives. We set
advertised marginal prices and marginal costs for both firms. In addition, the discount factor is
non-null and it is extremely small.
its opponent. Therefore, the weaker firm does not cheaply ride the market (Kr-
ishnamurthy, 2000). c By replacing Nash equilibrium strategies in formula (7), we
compute firms’ market shares. Figures 1–5 describe market shares dynamics. The
red, blue and green lines represent the dynamics of market shares of the stronger
firm (firm 1) and of weaker firm (firm 2) and of the whole market demand, respec-









. Firm 1 is initially weaker in the market. The market is initially not
saturated.
cWe consider the same values of ρi, βi, αi, ri in Table 1 and we choose higher discount rates.
From our numerical implementation, it follows that pure strategy Nash equilibria fail to exist if ρ
approximatively becomes higher than a threshold value equal to 0.040821.
















. Firm 1,2 equally share the market. The market is initially saturated.
and they improve their market positions. The weaker firm, i.e.firm 2, initially in-
creases its market position (blue line) and its market share reaches its maximum





















. Firm 1 is initially stronger on the market. The market is initially saturated.
at time t ≈ 2 and, then it decreases because of predatory effects. In Figure 1 the
stronger firm’s market share is initially smaller than the opponent’s one and mar-
ket shares become equal at t ≈ 16. If the market size is saturated, then any generic
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marketing effort is uninfluential in extending the market. Although firm 1 is more
effective in marketing campaigns and its initial market position is very dominant, its
market share decreases (Figure 5). The latter happens when the difference between
two initial market shares is high. If this difference is not high enough, then firm
1 keeps on improving its market share by making the opponent’s market position
weaker (Figures 3–4).
7. Conclusions, limitations and future work
We develop a novel duopolistic advertising model describing changes to the market
shares in a duopoly caused by strategic investments in generic and predatory ad-
vertising. We provide the existence of optimal investment strategies for firms with
lower production costs due to marketing incentives. We discuss marketing incentives
due to advertising by varying the parameters of the model. We provide numerical
insights on market share optima in an asymmetrical marketing scenario. We pro-
vide rational insights on how competing firms might ultimately reduce the quality
of manufactured goods when they publish the prices at the beginning of marketing
campaigns. Our work has some limitations. Optimal advertising investments are not
in a closed-form formula. Due to the lack of a closed form expression of these equi-
libria, we cannot study the sensitivity of optimal strategies to a change in marketing
parameters. Our main existence result lies in the assumption that the unique dis-
count rate is small. A natural question arising from this paper is, if firms are given
different discount rates, can we extend our main existence result? Future research
should consider parameterising this model using advanced econometric models in
order to estimate marketing incentives in our model. The latter will help to measure
the quality of products provided by firms competing during informative marketing
campaigns.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Analysing the first equation of system (5) we can see
that it is possible to separate the variables and integrate it as follows
dx
dt
= 2A (1− x)
x (t) = 1− Cxe
−2At.
If at t = 0 we have x (0) = x01 + x
0












For the function w (t) we have
dw
dt
= ρ1 b1 (u1) (x− w)− ρ2b2 (u2) (x+ w) = B
−x (t)−B+w (t) .
It is a linear equation of the first order. We integrate it using the standard approach
and obtain that the exact solution is given as




+tB−x (t) dt+ e−B
+tCu.
Therefore, for the function w (t) we have










































































Proof of Proposition 2. Since x1 =
x+w
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We therefore have obtained the formulae for the evolution of market shares given
the investment rates of firms 1,2. We have
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The expression of π2 (u1, u2) can be obtained in the same way. So we have derived
explicit formulae for payoffs.
Proof of Lemma 1. We assume that ρ 6= 0. Consider the exact form of the fourth












and representing the expres-





(2bc− 2r1dc+ 2r1gh) as a polynomial in u2, we find
that the sign of P (u2) is equal to the sign of the fourth coefficient. We have the
following polynomial expression















































where f(ρ) = o (ρ) is such that limρ→0
f(ρ)
ρ
= 0. By hypothesis we know that ρ ≈ 0,
then o (ρ) does not contribute to the signs of coefficients. If the following system of
equations
{
8ρ2 (β1α2ρ2 − r1ρ1α2 + ρ1α1β2 − 2r1ρ1β2) < 0
8ρ2 (2ρ2β1 + α1ρ2 + ρ1α1 − 2r1ρ1) < 0




























4β2ρ2β1 + α2ρ1α1 + α2α1ρ2 + 2β2α1ρ2
ρ1 (α2 + 2β2)
> 0
then we conclude that the second condition is stronger than the first in (19). By
hypothesis the second condition in (19) is satisfied. Then the first condition in (19)
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is satisfied. It thus follows there are no positive roots for the equation P (u2) = 0. It
is straightforward to verify that P (0) < 0. By continuity argument, it thus follows
that P (u2) < 0 for any u2 ≥ 0. Then the third coefficient is strictly negative for
any u2 ≥ 0.
















































































−4α1ρ2 (r1ρ1 − β1ρ2) + o (ρ)
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.




















































−4α1ρ2 (r1ρ1 − β1ρ2) < 0
which is trivially equivalent to r1ρ1−β1ρ2 > 0. If r1 > β1
ρ2
ρ1
then the fifth coefficient
is negative for any non negative value of û2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let û1 be a best reply to û2. Then û1 > 0 is a positive
root of equation (11). According to the Descartes’s rule of sign alterations, if the
number of sign alterations in the sequence of the coefficients of equations of a
polynomial equation is equal to 1, then there exists exactly one positive root of the
equation (Korn and Korn, 1968). Since the first and the second coefficients in left-
side of equation (11) are positive, we obtain the different cases in Table 2. Cases
are reduced by assuming that the third coefficient is not null in Table 2. If this
happens the number of sign alterations may be just lower to the previous case, i.e.
the third coefficient is not null. This happens since the first two coefficients of (11)
are not strictly negative. We clarify this ambiguity for the first four rows of Table
2. Let us suppose that the third coefficient is null then, the second coefficient is
positive. If it is strictly positive the number of alterations does not decrease. If the
second coefficient is null, then the first coefficient of (11) is strictly positive, i.e.
h2 > 0, since ρ1 > 0. Then, one of the first three coefficients is at least not null.
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Therefore The four rows of Table 2 do not present any change of the number of
sign alterations if the third coefficient is null. For the remaining last four rows of
Table 2, it is straightforward to prove that the number of sign alteration may be
lower if the third coefficient is null. In particular the number of sign alterations is
0 in the row 5 and it is 1 in the row 6. Table 2 fully represents the number of sign
alterations of (11).
Third coefficient Fourth coefficient Fifth coefficient Sign alterations
> 0 > 0 > 0 0
> 0 > 0 < 0 1
> 0 < 0 > 0 2
> 0 < 0 < 0 1
< 0(= 0) > 0 > 0 2 (0)
< 0(= 0) > 0 < 0 3 (1)
< 0 < 0 > 0 2
< 0 < 0 < 0 1
Table 2. Number of sign alterations in equation (11)
Taking into account our hypothesis, theses of Lemmas 1, 2 hold. Therefore the fourth
and the fifth coefficients are strictly negative. It follows from Table 2 that û1 > 0 is
the unique best reply to û2. If there is exactly one positive root of the numerator
of (12), and since the denominator is positive for any u1 > 0, the derivative of
payoffs takes negative values for u1 > û1 and positive values for u1 < û1. This
proves that û1 is a maximum point of π
1 (u1, û2) .
Proof of Lemma 4. By hypothesis, the thesis of Lemmas 3 is satisfied. Therefore,
best reply multifunctions Ûi are functions. In addition, Û1 are continuous since
payoffs in (8) are continuous. The rest of the proof is just technical and we leave it
to the reader. The proof is simply based on convergence properties of ai, bi when u
converges to ∞. In fact, we have limu2→∞ θ(u2) = ρ2 and limu2→∞ ϑ(u2) = 1.
